The Paris Climate Agreement is an important step for international climate policy, but the 22 compensation for negative effects of climate change based on clear assignment of responsibilities 23 remains highly debated. Both from a policy and science perspective, it is unclear how responsibilities 24 should be defined and on what evidence base. We explore different normative principles of justice 25
relevant to climate change impacts, and ask how different forms of causal evidence of impacts drawn 26 from detection and attribution research could inform policy approaches in accordance with justice 27 considerations. We reveal a procedural injustice based on the imbalance of observations and 28 knowledge of impacts between developed and developing countries. This type of injustice needs to 29 be considered in policy negotiations and decisions, and efforts be strengthened to reduce it. 30
31
The Paris Agreement 1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is 1 considered an important milestone in international climate policy. Among the most critical points 2 during the Paris negotiations were issues related to climate justice, including the question about 3 responsibilities for the negative impacts of anthropogenic climate change. Many developing 4 countries continued to emphasize the historical responsibility of the developed world. On the other 5 hand, developed countries were not willing to bear the full burden of climate responsibilities, 6 reasons among others being the current high levels of greenhouse gas emissions and substantial 7 financial power of some Parties categorized as developing countries (i.e. Non-Annex I) in the 8 UNFCCC. Many Annex I Parties were particularly uncomfortable with the issue of 'Loss and Damage' 9 (L&D), which is typically defined as the residual, adverse impacts of climate change beyond what can 10 be addressed by mitigation and adaptation 2, 3 . Although L&D is now anchored in the Paris Agreement 11 in a separate article (Article 8) 1 , questions of responsibility and claims for compensation of negative 12 impacts of climate change basically remain unsolved. 13
Claims for compensation, occasionally also called climate 'reparations' 4 , raise the question of who is 14 responsible for which negative climate change impacts, how to define such responsibilities and on 15
the basis of what type of evidence. Scientific evidence has become increasingly available from recent 16 studies and assessments, termed "detection and attribution of climate change impacts", revealing 17 numerous discernable impacts of climate change on natural, managed and human systems 18 worldwide 5-7 . In some cases, these impacts have been found to be substantial, but often the effects 19 of multiple non-climatic drivers ('confounders') acting on natural and especially human and managed 20 systems (e.g. land-use change, technical developments) have either been greater than the effect of 21 climate change or have rendered attempts to determine the relative importance thereof difficult. A 22 significant portion of attribution research has focused on the effects of increased atmospheric 23 greenhouse gas concentrations on extreme weather events, yet usually without adopting an impacts 24 perspective 8 . Recent studies have therefore emphasized the need for a more comprehensive 25 attribution framework that considers all components of risk (or L&D), including vulnerability and 26 exposure of assets and values in addition to climate hazards 9 . Other contributions have discussed the 27 role of attribution analysis for adaptation and L&D policies 10-13 . 28 How detection and attribution research could inform, or engage with climate policy and justice 29 debates is currently largely unclear. Some first sketches of a justice framework to address the 30 assignment of responsibility for L&D have recently been developed 14, 15 . However, the question of 31 which type of evidence would best cohere with each of the various concepts of justice has not been 32 addressed despite its importance for the achievement of progress in international climate policy. 33
34
In this Perspective we explore the different concepts and dimensions of normative justice research 1 relevant to issues of climate change impacts (see Textbox 1) . We adopt a normative perspective and 2 analyze how the application of principles of justice can inform respective political and legal contexts. 3 We study the extent to which different forms of scientific evidence on climate change impacts, 4
including detection and attribution research (see Textbox 2), can contribute to, or inform, the 5 respective justice questions and related policy debates. Normative principles of justice define who is 6 morally responsible for an impact and how to fairly distribute the burdens of remedy. In the political 7 and in particular in the legal context liability defines an agent's legal duties in case of unlawful 8 behavior 16 . Liability of an agent for climate change impacts defines a legal duty to pay for remedy of 9 the negative effects. Liability can comprise compensation for L&D but also, for instance, include 10 fines 17, 18 . 11
12
In the following we first address questions of liability and compensation and why a potential 13 implementation faces many hurdles on the scientific, political and legal level. We then consider the 14 role that recognition of moral responsibilities for climate change impacts could play in fostering 15 political reconciliation processes. Third, we explore the feasibility of the principle of ability to assist 16 (or pay) and focus on risk management mechanisms as a response to immediate and preventive 17 needs. Finally, we address the uneven distribution of knowledge about impacts across the globe as 18 assessed in the 5 th Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 19 (IPCC), and reveal an additional injustice on a procedural level with important further implications for 20 policy and science. 21 22 
23

BEGIN TEXT BOX 1: Justice principles relevant for climate change impacts 1
International climate policy is loaded with moral evaluations. The fact that emissions of greenhouse 2 gases from human activities lead to climate change is not morally blameworthy as such. In order to 3 assess emissions as ethically relevant it is necessary to evaluate their consequences based on 4 normative principles. The level at which climate change is "dangerous" in an ethically significant 5 sense has to be defined. Similarly, normative principles become relevant when differentiating 6 responsibilities in order to deal with the adverse effects of climate change 16, 19, 20 . In climate policy, as 7 reflected in normative climate justice research, the following principles are relevant for establishing 8 who bears responsibility for climate change impacts and for remedying those impacts: 9
Polluter-Pays-Principle (PPP): It is commonly accepted that those who have contributed or are 10 contributing more to anthropogenic climate change should shoulder the burdens of minimizing and 11 preventing climate change impacts in proportion to the magnitude of their contribution to the 12 problem. From a PPP perspective, it is not only high-emitting developed countries that are called into 13 responsibility to share the burden and assist low-emitting communities facing climate change risks, 14 but also high-emitting developing countries 21-23 . In this Perspective, we deal with the APP under the label of "Ability-to-Assist-Principle" (AAP) in order 26 to broaden the perspective beyond monetary payments toward consideration of assistance with 27 climate change impacts more generally. Furthermore, we do not address the difference between the 28 PPP and the BPP because to a large extent the sets of duty-bearers identified by the two principles 29 overlap. None of the above principles provides any natural guidance on the threshold for emissions 30 in terms of quantity or historical date at which they become a morally relevant contribution to 31 dangerous climate change. 32
END TEXT BOX 1: Justice principles relevant for climate change impacts BEGIN TEXT BOX 2: Evidence that climate change has impacted natural and human systems 1
Scientific evidence that human-induced climate change is impacting natural and humans systems can 2 come in a number of forms, each having different applications and implications 28 . We draw here an 3 analogy to U.S. environmental litigation 29 where typically two types of causation are relevant: 4 "general causation" refers to the question of whether a substance is capable of causing a particular 5 damage, injury or condition, while "specific causation" refers to a particular substance causing a 6 specific individual's injury. 7
In the line of general causation, evidence for the potential existence of anthropogenic climate change 8 impacts is relatively abundant (for more examples and references see the main text). Long-term 9 monitoring may, for instance, reveal a trend toward more frequent wildfires in an unpopulated area. 10
These observations may have little to say about the relevance of climate change, or of emissions for 11 that climate change, but they can be useful for highlighting the potential urgency of an issue. 12
Another form of evidence may come from a mechanistic understanding of how a system should 13 respond to some change in its environmental conditions. The ranges of plant and animal species 14 may, for instance, shift polewards in response to an observed or expected warming. In this case, the 15 relevance to human-induced climate change may be explicit, but it remains unclear whether the 16 range shifts have indeed occurred. 17
In order to be confident that an impact of anthropogenic climate change has indeed occurred, more 18 direct evidence is required, akin to "specific evidence" in U.S. environmental litigation 29 . The most 19 complete set of information for understanding past changes in climate and its impacts, commonly 20 referred to as "detection and attribution", combines observational and mechanistic evidence, by 21 confronting predictions of recent changes based on our mechanistic understanding with observations 22 of long-term variations 30 . These analyses address two questions: the first, detection, examines 23
whether the natural or human system has indeed been affected by anthropogenic climate change, 24 versus changes that may be related to natural climate variability or non-climatic factors. The second, 25 attribution, estimates the magnitude of the effect of anthropogenic climate change as compared to 26 the effect of other factors. These other factors (also termed 'confounders') might be considered 27 external drivers of the observed change (e.g. deforestation driving land-cover changes). 28 Impacts of multi-decadal trends in climate have now been detected in many different aspects of 29 natural and human systems across the continents and oceans of the planet 6 . Analysis of the relevant 30 climate trends suggests that anthropogenic emissions have played a major role in at least two thirds 31 of the impacts induced by warming, but few of the impacts resulting from precipitation trends can 32 yet be confidently linked to anthropogenic emissions 7 . Overall, research on detection and attribution 33 of climate change impacts is still emerging and there remain few studies available that demonstrate 1 a causal link between anthropogenic emissions, climate trends and impacts. 2 Compensation of those who suffer harm by those responsible for the harm, and more specifically, 3 responsible for the negative impacts of climate change, represents a legitimate claim from the 4 perspective of normative justice research 23, [31] [32] [33] . In their most common understanding, principles 5 such as the PPP or BPP provide the justice framework to identify those responsible for climate 6 change impacts and establish a basis for liability and compensation (see Textbox 1). However, issues 7 of compensation have not yet been sufficiently clarified and remain contested in international 8 climate policy. Driven by the pressure exerted by countries such as the U.S. and others, the notion 9 that L&D involves or provides a basis for liability and compensation has been explicitly excluded in 10 the decisions taken in Paris 2015 1 . L&D has previously been thought to require consideration of 11 causation, as well as the deviations from some (possibly historical) baseline condition 34 . The Paris 12
END TEXT BOX: Evidence that climate change has impacted natural and human systems
Agreement and related discussions have not offered any clarity about what type of evidence would 13 be required for claims of liability and compensation to be legitimate, either from a normative 14 perspective considering different principles of justice (see Textbox 1) or in relation to legal 15 mechanisms under international policy. Liability and compensation represent the strongest and most 16 rigid reference frame to clarify who is responsible to remedy climate change impacts, but also involve 17 major challenges, both in terms of policy and science, as we will outline below. Liability and 18 compensation involve clarification of impacts due to climate variability versus anthropogenic climate 19 change, since no one can be morally blamed or held legally liable for negative impacts wholly 20 resulting from natural climate variability 21, 22, 27 . Accordingly, and as further detailed below, we 21 suggest that here the strongest scientific evidence in line with specific causation is required, i.e. 22 detection and attribution (see Textbox 2). 23 climatic drivers such as regional changes in average or extreme air temperature, precipitation, or 28 ocean water temperature. Due to the high likelihood of a major anthropogenic role in observed 29 trends in these regional climate drivers, there is accordingly potential for high confidence in 30 detection and attribution of related impacts of anthropogenic climate change 7 . 31
The negative impacts of climate change potentially relevant for liability and compensation usually 32 concern human systems, and for these climatic drivers are typically less important than for natural 33 systems: any anthropogenic climate effect can be outweighed by the magnitude of socio-economic 34 changes, for instance considered in terms of exposure and vulnerability (e.g. expansion of exposed assets or people, or increasing climate resilient infrastructure). As a consequence, as documented in 1 the IPCC AR5 and subsequent studies 6,7 , there is currently only low confidence in the attribution of a 2 major climate change role in impacts on human systems, except for polar and high mountain regions 3 where livelihood conditions are strongly tied to climatic and cryospheric systems ( Fig. 1 ). 4
In order to establish confidence in the detection of impacts, long-term, reliable, high-quality 5 observations, as well as better process understanding, are crucial for both natural and human 6 systems. Assuming that some substantial level of confidence will be required for issues of liability and 7 compensation, we need to recognize that a very high bar is set by requiring high-quality observations 8 over periods of several decades. Precisely these requirements are likely one of the reasons why 9 studies of detection and attribution of impacts to anthropogenic climate change are still rare. Damages specified for California included reduced snow pack, increased coastal erosion due to rising 21 sea levels, and increased frequency and duration of extreme heat events. As with several other 22 lawsuits, the case was dismissed on the grounds that non-justiciable political questions were raised. 23
Further legal avenues that have been taken and researched with respect to the negative impacts of 24 climate change include human rights in both domestic and international law 34, 39, 40 . 25
Generally, currently available experiences cannot sufficiently clarify what type of evidence would be 26 needed in court to defend a legal case on climate change liability. However, there is useful precedent 27 from litigation over harm caused by exposure to toxic substance where typically specific causation is 28 required 41 . In our context, hence, this translates into detection and attribution of impacts of 29 anthropogenic climate change. 30
Overall, experience so far indicates that the hurdles are considerable, and they may range from 31 aspects of justiciability, to the proof required for causation, to the applicability of the no-harm rule 32 established in international law or of the application of extraterritoriality in human rights law 29, 39, 42, 43 . 33
Based on these challenges and on the analysis of precedents from cases with harm due to exposure 34 to toxic substances, some scholars favor ex-ante compensation as compared to ex-post compensation and refer to experiences with monetary disaster funds used to compensate affected 1 vicitms 41 . It is interesting to note that in one of the very few lawsuits on climate change liability that 2 have been accepted by a court ex-ante compensation is claimed. In this currently ongoing legal case 3 at a German court, a citizen of the city of Huaraz in Peru is suing RWE, a large German energy 4 producer, for their cumulative emissions causing an increased local risk of floods from a glacier lake 5 in the Andes that formed as glaciers receded. Specific causation is likely required for this case but 6 additional difficulty arises from proving the relation of harm of an individual to emissions. From an 7 attribution point of view governments are in a better position to claim compensation than individuals 8 because damages due to climate change can be aggregated over time and space over their territory 9 and/or economic interests 44 . 10
In conclusion, at the current state of legal practice, political discussions and available scientific 11 evidence, significant progress in terms of liability and compensation seems rather unlikely in the near 12 future. Politically, creating a monetary fund in line with considerations of ex-ante compensation may 13 yet be the most feasible mechanism. In the following, we present two alternative approaches to 14 achieve justice in relation to climate change impacts. 15 16 17
Recognition of responsibilities and reconciliation 18 19
As a first alternative we refer to the notion that legitimate claims of justice may extend beyond 20 questions of liability and compensation, involving instead restorative justice, and more specifically 21 recognition and acknowledgement of moral responsibilities for climate change impacts 14 . Following 22 from that, we argue that recognition of responsibilities would be a first important step in any process 23 of reconciliation. 24
Reconciliation is often discussed in the context of normative restorative (or transitional) justice 25 research, which typically relates to the aftermath of violence and repression 45, 46 . In this context it is 26 argued that recognition of wrongs is important in order to attain and maintain social stability 47 . In the 27 case of the negative effects of climate change, recognition could play a similar role. However, since 28 the most negative effects of climate change will occur at least several decades from now, ex-ante 29 recognition of responsibilities of climate change impacts would be required to support maintaining 30 social stability. Recognition of responsibilities neither is the final step nor does it exclude the 31 possibility of compensation, but we suggest it can represent a fundamental element in the process, 32 especially where recovery has limitations. This is particularly the case when impacts of climate 33 change are irreversible, such as for submersion of low-lying islands, permafrost thawing in the Arctic, 34 or loss of glaciers in mountain regions [48] [49] [50] [51] . 35
On the level of scientific evidence, recognition of responsibilities as a first step in a reconciliation 1 process implies clarification of those who caused, or contributed to, negative impacts of 2 anthropogenic climate change, and of those who suffer the damage and losses. If the goal is a 3 practical first step in a reconciliation process between those generally contributing to and those 4 generally being impacted by climate change, rather than experiencing a specific impact, then we 5 argue that basic understanding of causation (i.e. general causation) could provide sufficient evidence. 6
Understanding of general causation (see Textbox 2) can rely on multiple lines of evidence collected 7 from observations, modeling or physical understanding, but not all are necessarily required and nor 8 do they all have to concern the exact impact and location in question 28 . According to physical 9 understanding, for instance, warming implies glacier shrinkage and thus changes in the contribution 10 of ice melt to river runoff 52,53 or formation and growth of glacier lakes with possible lake outburst 11 floods and associated risks 54,55 . As another example, given the sensitivity of crops such as grapes or 12 coffee to changes in temperature, precipitation, and soil moisture 56-58 we can expect that yield, 13 quality, phenology, pest and disease, planting site suitability and possibly supply chains may be 14 affected 59-62 . However, our understanding will be limited with respect to the exact magnitude of 15 these impacts, especially along cascades of impacts from crop production to food supply. Further 16 challenges arise from ongoing adaptation in human and managed systems, in particular for 17 agricultural systems as demonstrated in recent studies 63, 64 . 18
Thus, while we suggest that understanding of general causation could serve the reconciliation 19 processes, the value and limitations of this sort of evidence may vary among different types of 20 impacts and is not likely to be sufficient to attain justice in the full sense. In climate policy, as the 21 Paris negotiations have shown, many countries do in fact recognize some moral responsibility for 22 impacts of climate change, but are reluctant to define any legal implications thereof in more detail. 23
Against this background, we believe that explicit recognition of moral responsibilities for climate 24 change impacts plays a significant role in fostering cooperation among the Parties to the UNFCCC. 25
27
The ability to assist principle and risk management 28 29 Discourses on global justice provide the grounds for a second alternative beyond liabilities and 30 compensation. A number of scholars offer arguments to distinguish between responsibilities to assist 31 and claims for compensation from those liable for harm [65] [66] [67] [68] . Ability to assist (AAP) is in line with the 32 APP (see Textbox 1) and assumes an assignment of responsibilities proportional to economic, 33 technological and logistic capacities. With regard to climate change impacts specifically, we argue 34 that prioritizing the ability to assist is supported in the following contexts 15, 67, 69 : when a projected 35 climate impact is severe and immediate help is needed; when there is missing clarity on whether the 1 party causing a negative impact did something morally wrong; or when the party responsible for the 2 impact is not able to provide full recovery. It is important to note that prioritizing AAP does not mean 3 that PPP and BPP should be dismissed altogether. Rather we think that AAP is more plausible and 4 feasible in the aforementioned contexts than the other justice principles. 5
In the context of climate change impacts, we suggest that AAP includes an ex-ante component to 6 facilitate prevention of and preparedness for L&D. Many different mechanisms exist to meet 7 responsibilities to assist in the aforementioned sense and context, including reconstruction, 8 programs to strengthen preparedness and institutions responsible for risk management, or 9 technology transfer. Most of these mechanisms can be accommodated under the perspective of 10 integrative risk management 70 . 11
Appropriate identification and understanding of risks, and how risks change over time, is an 12 important prerequisite for risk management. In the IPCC AR5 risk is defined as a function of (climate) 13 hazard, exposure of assets and people, and their vulnerability 71 . For the climate hazard component of 14 risks, extreme weather events are a primary concern. A large number of studies have identified 15 observed trends in extreme weather, both globally 72-74 and regionally 75, 76 Risk management yet should not only be concerned with impacts of extreme weather events but also 24 with negative effects of gradual climate change on natural, human and managed systems. Based on 25 the assessment of the IPCC AR5, concern for unique and threatened systems has mounted for Arctic, 26 marine and mountain systems, including Arctic marine ecosystems, glaciers and permafrost, and 27
Arctic indigenous livelihoods 6 . Impacts of gradual climate change are often exacerbated by extreme 28 events, thus enhancing risks and complicating attribution 90 . Furthermore, impacts of climate change 29 usually occur within a context of multiple non-climatic drivers of risk. Effective identification of 30 specific activities to reduce risk may require estimation of the relative balance of the contributions of 31 climatic and non-climatic drivers. However, understanding of general causation, in the form for 32 instance of process-based understanding, may not provide sufficient precision to distinguish the 33 relative importance of the various drivers; in that case, more refined information generated through 34 detection and attribution analysis may be required. This, however, implies the availability of long-1 term data which is limited in many developing countries. 2
In the context of international climate policy, assistance provided to strengthen risk management is 3 largely uncontested and is supported in many documents 91 . Hence, political feasibility, the justice 4 basis and potential progress in scientific evidence make risk management a promising vehicle for 5 addressing climate change impacts. 6 7 8
Injustices from the imbalance of climate and impact monitoring 9
10
Depending on the approaches outlined in the previous sections, observational monitoring of climate 11 and impacts can be of fundamental importance in order to provide the necessary causal evidence, 12 and to satisfy justice claims posed by many Parties. In this light, it is informative to consider the 13 distribution of long-term climate observations, as well as that of the detected and attributed impacts 14 as assessed by the IPCC AR5 6 . As Figure 2 shows, the distribution of both long-term recording 15 weather stations and observed impacts of climate change is unequal across the globe. Observations 16 of non-climatic factors, which are important to assess the magnitude of impacts of climatic versus 17 non-climatic factors, are not shown in Figure 2 but are likely to show a similar imbalanced pattern. 18
The analysis of attributed impacts based on IPCC AR5 6 reveals that more than 60% of the attributed 19 impacts considered come from the 43 Annex I countries while the 154 Non-Annex I countries feature 20 less than 40% of the observations (Fig. 3) . This imbalance is even larger if the least developed 21 countries (LDC) and the countries of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (80 countries together) 22 are considered, for which less than 20% of globally detected and attributed impacts are reported. 23
While different identified impacts in the IPCC AR5 reflect different degrees of aggregation (e.g. 24 aggregating phenological shifts across species on a continent into a single impact unit), this 25 aggregation tends to be amplified in Annex I countries, and thus understates the geographical 26 contrast in terms of available evidence between developed and developing countries. Additionally, 27
Non-Annex I, LDC and SIDS countries generally have a higher proportion of impacts with very low and 28 low confidence in attribution to climate change whereas Annex I countries have more impacts with 29 high confidence in attribution. The assignment of confidence thereby typically relates, among other 30 things, to the quality and duration of available observational series 92-94 ; this also holds for the 31 attribution of observed climate trends to greenhouse gas emissions 95 . This imbalance thus reflects an 32 unequal distribution of monitoring for physical as well as for biological, managed and human 33 systems. 34
The results of this analysis imply new kinds of injustices involved in the approaches discussed above. 1 Whichever approach is chosen, the unequal distribution of observed and attributed impacts, and of 2 the confidence in assessments, implies an unjustified disadvantage for those most in need of what measures are taken. Hence, the point here is not the potentially unfair outcomes of 10 negotiations but the fairness of the process of negotiating itself. The imbalance of the distribution of 11 detected and attributed impacts was in fact an issue during the final IPCC AR5 government approval 12 process 96 , indicating concern that voices from some actors and parties might be downplayed or 13 ignored due to lack of hard evidence for perceived impacts. This proposal is perfectly in line with the UNFCCC and decisions taken at recent negotiations 21 including COP21 1,91 , and actions and programs underway in several Non-Annex I countries, hence 22 strongly increasing its political feasibility. The lack of monitoring and observations has been long 23 recognized but the related procedural injustice has not received much discussion. Our analysis 24 intends to provide the justice basis and context to justify strengthening these efforts. 25
However, even if such efforts are substantially developed in the near future, a major challenge 26 remains in how to cope with non-existing or low-quality observational records of the past decades in 27 countries were no corresponding monitoring had been in place. Reconstruction of past climate 28 change impacts and events exploiting historical satellite data, on-site field mapping, searching 29 historical archives, etc. may be able to recover missing data to some extent. Different and diverse 30 forms of knowledge existing in various regions and localities can be of additional value but need to 31 be evaluated in their respective context to avoid simplistic comparisons of, for instance, scientific 32 versus local knowledge 97 . Substantial observational limitations, however, will likely remain and the 33 implications for the aforementioned approaches toward justice need to be seriously considered. 34 1 Developing evidence for just policy 2 3 In this Perspective we discussed different approaches towards justice regarding negative climate 4 change impacts. We argued that depending on the approach chosen, different kinds of evidence 5 concerning detection and attribution of climate change impacts are needed. Establishing liabilities in 6 a legal or political context to seek compensation sets the highest bar, and we suggest that it requires 7 detection and attribution in line with specific causation. However, in general the level of scientific 8 evidence currently available rarely supports high confidence in linking impacts to emissions, except 9
for some natural and human systems related to the mountain and Arctic cryosphere and the health 10 of warm water corals. Hence, claims for compensation based on liabilities will likely continue to 11 encounter scientific hurdles, in addition to various political and legal hurdles. 12
Understanding the role of climate change in trends in impacted natural and human systems at a level 13 of evidence currently available can still effectively inform other justice principles which in our view 14 are politically much more feasible, namely recognition of responsibilities and ability to assist. 15
Attribution research can clarify responsibilities and thus facilitate their recognition; and it can 16 enhance the understanding of drivers of risks as a basis for improved risk management. More 17 rigorous implementation of risk management is actually critical to prevent and reduce future L&D. 18
Whether recognition of responsibilities and APP / AAP are politically sufficient to facilitate ex-ante 19 compensation, for instance with the creation of a monetary fund for current or future victims of 20 climate change impacts, needs yet to be seen. 21
Finally, the imbalance of observed and attributed climate change impacts leaves those countries 22 most in need of assistance (i.e. SIDS and LDC countries) with relatively poor evidence in support of 23 appropriate risk management approaches or any claim for liability and related compensation in 24 international climate policy or at courts. We have argued that evidence in line with general causation 25 may be sufficient for recognition of responsibilities, and hence, this may well speak in favor of this 26 justice approach, considering the aforementioned limitations in observations and attribution. 27
Recognition of responsibilities cannot represent the final step to attain justice, however, and we 28 therefore suggest that two issues remain crucial: i) procedural injustice resulting from an imbalance 29 of detected and attributed impacts should be considered as a fundamental issue in negotiations and 30 decision making in international climate policy; and ii) monitoring of climate change impacts in 31 natural and human systems, and local capacities in developing countries need to be substantially 32 strengthened. Efforts taken now will be of critical value for the future when climate change impacts 33 are expected to be more severe than experienced so far. 34 
